The definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results. Tragically, though, when it comes to American efforts to end Russia’s war in Ukraine, insanity is among the most charitable explanations available. America’s negotiating team, led by Donald Trump’s son-in-law and his golfing buddy, have proven remarkably resistant to learning either from their own failures over months of repetitive iterations of so-called “peace talks,” or from the accumulated experience of centuries of diplomatic engagement with Russia that lay down clear principles that determine success or failure. But then, they have different priorities.
This resistance to learning has been combined with the pursuit of profits from the process to produce a toxic mix that is too often indistinguishable from coercing the victim into surrender and rewarding the aggressor. A recent US initiative proposed resuming shipments of Russian gas to Europe via Ukraine, with the profits held by a US intermediary in order to work around European sanctions. This proposal was unsurprisingly rejected by European officials.
While the idea was presented as a means of benefiting Ukraine via transit fees, and some European politicians would welcome a return to dependence on Russian gas if it reduced current high energy costs, the primary beneficiaries would, as always, be Moscow and the American “intermediaries”. In presenting the Kremlin with ever greater concessions and incentives, while avoiding exerting any pressure on Moscow that would be meaningful to its leadership, the current US approach is treading a well-worn path to failure in its claimed objectives. This is true, even if Zelensky has welcomed Washington’s commitment to involve Europe in the next round of peace talks, as well as the process overall — but then he has no choice. To describe its true nature could precipitate a definitive break with the Trump White House.
It was clear from an early stage in the cycles of negotiations that Putin had concluded he could string the Trump group along in order to extract ever greater benefits from the United States. The US is providing Putin with repeated confirmation that this is correct. Last month saw the Trump administration floating the idea of yet another concession to Russia: lifting sanctions on the country’s flagship “government investment fund”, one of the Kremlin’s most powerful tools of international influence. The attitude is fuelled by the credulity of US investors who are unable to resist the lure of fantasy numbers dangled by their Russian counterparts, and unwilling to learn from the experience of businesses that have sunk money into Russia only to have it stolen by the Kremlin — in some cases repeatedly.
Any economic upside of cooperating with Russia that is being sold to the Americans is a fantasy. Since Trump announced a deal to buy diesel from Moscow last month in a desperate bid to reduce the cost of energy in the US, not a single barrel of Russian oil has arrived on American shores. He went on to suffer a stinging rebuke in the midterms anyway, having angered Zelensky and Europe. Moscow, though, finds it profitable to sustain the illusion that negotiations and compromise may provide a pathway to ending its aggression against Ukraine. Western countries accustomed to resolving peaceful disputes among themselves have been all too eager to buy into this idea.
In the previous decade, I wrote a book called Moscow Rules, where I brought together the key lessons foreign leaders and diplomats had learned in the past for how to handle Russia’s determination to expand its power and territory. One of the fundamental lessons, repeated consistently over history, was that unilateral concessions or expressions of goodwill in the hope that Russia will reciprocate are a direct route to failure, and are inevitably read as weakness and an invitation to demand more. A ceasefire in Russian-occupied Oleshky earlier this month affected just a tiny portion of the immensely long front line.
But it demonstrated an important principle: that Russia is perfectly capable of ending the fighting when it chooses to. If Vladimir Putin gave the order, the war would be over. But he will only do so if the alternative — fighting on — is made into a worse option for him. And that can’t happen without greater willingness by Ukraine’s backers to increase the costs of the war to Russia, rather than by presenting gifts to the Kremlin. That willingness has been limited by a conceptual failure among Western leaders. Beyond the front-line states, too many of them are still simply unable to imagine defeat for Russia – or have been so conditioned by decades of Russian propaganda that they fear it more than they fear the destruction of Russia’s European neighbours.
Ukraine has resumed strikes on Russia’s oil refining industry, after pressure from the United States to suspend them. That’s a tactic that is so effective that US efforts to prevent it are not a Trump innovation. The previous Biden administration also sought to constrain Ukraine from being too successful in the energy war. This mindset may also lie behind reporting last month that US Pentagon officials had asked several Nato countries to tone down their public statements both about the threat posed by Moscow and about how Russia itself is now suffering the consequences of its war.