Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani with Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Reuters

Hollie S. McKay, Indo-Asian News Service

As the United States prepares to pull out the entirety of its remaining 2,500 troops from Afghanistan (Liptak, 2021) — a move fast being followed by NATO allies in the war-tattered nation (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation [NATO], 2021a, 2021b) — the onus for security and stability will fall on the regions neighbours.

However, this is a window of opportunity in which India can lead the way. It will not be an easy or simple process. As the Taliban become increasingly assertive in the ongoing peace talks and potentially set to govern the country again someday, it is vital that New Delhi carves a channel for diplomatic dealings.

So far there have been some evident efforts in that direction. Indian officials are taking an increasingly visible role in the various meetings concerning Afghanistan’s future, of which Taliban members have been party. New Delhi will attend the ten-day Istanbul conference starting this week (Aljazeera, 2021; Did Press Agency, 2021).

Of course, India’s history with the Taliban — for instance when it was poised at the Kabul helm from 1996 to 2001 — has been a turbulent one. This is not surprising given the Taliban’s protracted policy of directly and indirectly supporting Pakistani militant groups, a policy which has resulted among other things in various skirmishes in Jammu and Kashmir.

Moreover, it is hard to forget the painful hijacking of an Indian Airlines flight in 1999 by five Taliban gunmen, resulting in one passenger being fatally stabbed and 17 being wounded (Joshi, 2020). Allegations of involvement by the Pakistani ISI inflamed the aftermath.

And certainly, the Taliban’s perchance for violence and the ruthless targeting of both Afghan forces and civilians in recent years reminds all the sobering reality that their overarching tactical approach remains unchanged. Furthermore and of course, India’s leaders cannot enthusiastically align with a political faction that ideologically limits the education and vocational opportunities for women and endorses extremist values that amount to violence and terrorism.

The diplomatic dance with the Taliban must therefore be delicate, but not dismissive. Uncomfortable facts are facts nonetheless, and India will need to work with the reality on the ground if — or when — the Taliban resume a potent palace position.

On the plus side, the Taliban’s top brass has not — for some two decades — made explicit anti-New Delhi threats. They were swift to release, following quiet negotiations, the seven captured Indian engineers working in Afghanistan three years ago (The Economic Times, 2019).

The organisation has also refrained from sabotaging or attacking India-backed development projects in Afghanistan — all of which should be perceived as positive tools for the communications arsenal. The success in this area may have stemmed in large part from New Delhi’s non-militarized Afghan strategy.

Rather than bolstering Kabul’s security endeavours with boots on the ground, India’s lawmakers instead opted for a “soft power” approach — focusing its support spending on economic and infrastructure projects, as well as community-centric development and humanitarian aid. The war-splattered nation is the second-largest beneficiary of Indian assistance (Vivek, 2017), shoring up a positive perception of India among much of the Afghan citizenry — a critical puzzle piece for future influence in the embattled nation.

Indeed, India has built up a robust portfolio of strategic interests in Afghanistan — despite its conflicts and volatility. A good example is the $100 million enlargement of the Chabahar port (Zee News, 2014) to serve as an import-export core between Central Asia and Afghanistan.

By opting to play a more pervasive part in Afghanistan, India also stands to secure even closer strategic ties to the United States. Washington has vowed to maintain its diplomatic and humanitarian endeavours in Afghanistan after the military exit, and President Biden has expressed a desire to see neighbouring nations play more prominent roles.

US State Department spokesperson Ned Price announced this month that Secretary Tony Blinken and his Indian counterpart S. Jaishankar would work together in advocating Afghanistan cohesion. This of course constitutes the outgrowth of a long and trusting affinity (The Week, 2021).

India can also coordinate its strategy and act as something of an interlocutor for all countries directly impacted by security affairs in Afghanistan — China, Russia, Pakistan, Turkey, Qatar and beyond.

The Taliban may, in the end, turn out to be a necessary bastion against groups that pose threats both within and outside of Afghanistan’s borders.