David Frost, Mark Sedwill.

Bill Tupman, The Independent

Everything has changed because of the coronavirus, and crime is no exception. Criminals have adapted to the pandemic, and this isn’t the only major challenge facing the police and security services. The appointment of a new national security adviser, and our imminent Brexit, also complicate the efforts of those working to keep us safe.

Covid-19 means fewer flights, ferry crossings and movement in general, making the trafficking of drugs and people more exposed to discovery by the security services. On the other hand, there are new opportunities for organised crime: black markets in personal protective equipment (PPE); fraudulent health products; and counterfeit medicines and snake-oil sales schemes. They all have obvious potential for exploitation, as does the problem of personnel shortages in health services. Meanwhile, illicit drugs have already been discovered hidden in consignments of much-needed PPE. The trend to commit crime via the internet will also be further enhanced.

Intelligence about the changing nature of criminality was always important, but as the pace of that change increases, it is vital. The departure of Sir Mark Sedwill as head of the civil service is not wholly a shock, given the briefings against him over recent months. More significant, though, is his replacement as national security adviser with David Frost, the prime minister’s Brexit adviser who will remain as chief Brexit negotiator. As face-to-face negotiations restart, attention will return to the way in which security and police cooperation will be affected.

The UK has always been an outlier in European justice and home affairs policy, but the ability and skill of the country’s detectives has always been admired — as is the British policy of policing by consent. This has led to an assumption among British negotiators that the EU will have to give the UK something in exchange for our continued cooperation.

They know that without this, following Brexit, there is a possibility that the UK will become an offshore haven for transnational criminals because extradition will be problematic and money laundering so easy. The UK will expect cooperation from the rest of Europe in finding and returning its offenders, while possibly refusing or delaying the extradition and provision of evidence to police and judicial authorities outside its borders. The country will become attractive to people smugglers because stronger border controls will enable them to put their prices up.

UK negotiators in the Brexit talks are confident that the country will still cooperate with the EU in justice and home affairs through mutual legal-aid agreements that will lead to the arrest and prosecution of criminals. They are critically underestimating the nature and complexity of cross-border criminal networks, and not taking into account differences in legal and policing procedures (unlike many EU nations, UK investigators and politicians favour disruption over prosecution, arguing that prosecution takes too long and that juries tend not to understand complex cases and therefore acquit).

People working in the intelligence and security services want to share data with their counterparts in other countries after Brexit. UK politicians are uncomfortable with this because this means UK security activity would be supervised by the European courts; though they might be happy to look at data from EU countries, they are much less happy to have investigators from those countries accessing UK data. The EU itself is, of course, very suspicious of UK data-protection law and procedures. That the Home Office failed to admit the wrongful storage of data from EU databases and the sharing of such data with the US (and probably the rest of the “Five Eyes”) has strengthened this suspicion.