Iran marks 45 years of the Islamic Revolution

Iran marked the 45th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution on February 10th with speeches, mass gatherings, displays of military hardware, and the traditional chants, “Death to America” and “Death to Israel.” By putting on a grand display, the clerical government hoped to encourage Iranians to cast ballots in the March elections for parliament and the Assembly of Experts, a key institution in the regime. Voter turnout has been falling for a number of years, denying the government affirmation of legitimacy. Only 49 per cent cast ballots in the carefully choreographed 2021 presidential election which was won by ultra-conservative Ebrahim Raisi.

The hybrid system of governance established by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1979-1980 has survived for four and a half decades despite eruptions of domestic discontent and constant challenges from the US which has never forgiven the clerics for toppling the Shah. Washington’s Western allies have followed suit while Israel has exploited this hostility to promote its own agenda of isolating and threatening Iran with war.

The country is ruled by a hierarchy of clerics and select laymen who accept the ultimate authority of the guardian-jurist “walayat-fagih,” known as the supreme leader and head of state who is Khomeini’s successor Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Next in importance is the 88-member Assembly of Experts, comprised of elected clerics who choose the supreme leader. The 12-member Guardian Council, the upper House of Parliament which vets candidates seeking office, consists of six jurists chosen by the supreme guide, and six jurists selected by the Consultative Assembly. The prestigious Expediency Council is chosen by the supreme leader as an advisory body.

The Consultative Assembly, the 290-member lower House elected by popular vote, enacts laws in line with the revolutionary constitution. The president is the head of state who chooses a dozen vice presidents and a prime minister. He exercises executive power and selects cabinet ministers who must be approved by the Consultative Assembly.

Although Iran’s system of governance conforms to the framework created by Khomeini, presidents were able to adopt very different agendas while in office, shifting back and forth between conservative and reformist policies on both domestic and foreign levels.

After the brief terms in office of Iran’s two initial lay presidents between 1980-1981, five clerics and one layman have held the presidency. Conservative Ali Khamenei, now supreme guide, was the first. He was followed by pragmatist Hashemi Rafsanjani who backed a free-market economy and adopted a moderate line in international affairs. He was succeeded by liberal reformist Mohammed Khatami who promoted “dialogue of civilisations” with the aim of ending Iran’s isolation. Fed up with moderates, conservatives organised the election of hardline layman Mahmoud Ahmadinejad who reversed his predecessors’ key reforms and courted Western hostility.

Reformist Hassan Rouhani managed to repair damage inflicted by Ahmedinejad and achieve a breakthrough with the West by negotiating the 2015 agreement to limit Iran’s nuclear programme in exchange for lifting sanctions. Iran’s sanctions-ridden economy briefly benefitted by attaining a spurt of growth and Tehran’s global standing improved until May 2018 when Donald Trump torpedoed the agreement. Tehran responded by exceeding limits laid down in the deal of enriched uranium, curbing UN experts’ access to the nuclear programme, and engineering the election of ultra-conservative Ebrahim Raisi.

On the domestic level, the ruling clerics promised freedom, democracy, equality, and economic advancement. The record has been mixed. Freedom and democracy have been limited, neglected rural communities have advanced, literacy and university enrolment have increased, and infant and maternal mortality rates have decreased. Inflation and unemployment have soared in recent years. Mismanagement and corruption have flourished from the outset of the revolution.

Conservative cultural and social impositions – including mandatory wearing of the headscarf or hijab for women – have created a rift between conservative revolutionaries and successive generations. Between 1999 and 2022-2023 there were ten uprisings, the latest stirred by the death in morality police custody of Mahsa Amini, 22, a Kurdish-Iranian woman accused of “bad hijab.” During each of these disturbances the clerics have clamped down hard.

On the regional level, the clerics were prevented from exporting their revolution by the 1980-1988 war with Iraq but have gained a role by intervening in conflicts. During Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, Iranian Revolutionary Guards based in the Beqaa armed and trained Lebanese Shia militiamen who eventually coalesced into Hezbollah. In 2000 the movement’s military wing drove Israeli forces and proxies from the south and in 2006 defended Lebanon against Israeli attack. Hezbollah remains the main deterrent against Israeli military action against Lebanon and has become the main power-broker in the country.

From the late 1980’s through last year, Iran funded Palestinian Hamas in its struggle against Israel’s occupation. Following the 2003 US conquest of Iraq, ignorant Washington invited pro-Iran expatriate Iraqi politicians to take control of the country. Between 2014-2019 the US partnered with pro-Iranian Shia militias to fight Daesh. Militia leaders have founded political parties which form a strong grouping in parliament and demand the withdrawal of 2,500 US soldiers from Iraq.

Between 2011-2019, pro-Iran Iraqi militia fighters fought on the side of the Syrian government during the country’s civil/proxy wars. Iran has given limited backing to the Yemeni Houthis who now hold the north of the country. While enjoying Tehran’s backing, the four groups largely function independently under the umbrella of the “axis of resistance.”

Since Hamas attacked Israel on October 7th, Hezbollah, the Iraqi militias, and the Houthis have mounted calibrated attacks on Israel and the US. Iranian diplomats, officials, and military men have recently urged “restraint.” By design or accident, the one or other or all three could transform Israel’s war on Gaza into a regional war neither Iran nor the US and its Western allies want.

Iran has also advanced on the political scene. Last year, Iran escaped isolation by reconciling with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia and joined the BRICS group of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.