Just a few days before Netanyahu’s last visit to the White House, the Washington Post (June 25) run a story about Shimon Peres urging the United States and other world powers to engage with Hamas in order to persuade the hardliner group to renounce violence and prepare for peace with Israel. As the Obama administration was preparing to receive the Israeli Prime Minister, the influential magazine Foreign Policy (July 4) run an opinion by Michele Dunne (Editor of Carnegie’s Arab Reform Bulletin), in which she suggests that if Washington does not need at this point to engage directly Hamas, it can do it indirectly. Dunne contends that the only way out of the stalemate is to encourage the reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas instead of impeding it, and to make of it the basis to “broker a power-sharing arrangement,” without which any further negotiations about an Israeli-Palestinian peace would be pipedream.

Indeed. Any attentive observer knows that even weakened by the blockade Hamas can still hamper peace efforts. But at this time, Peres’s suggestion may be hard to achieve. Instead, the suggestion of indirect action as a way of preparing all the parties to tackle new givens, is more practical, for we know that dealing with this issue implies a disposition in Israel and the United States to change their stance regarding Hamas, so far considered “terrorist.”

On the one hand, encouraging Palestinian reconciliation may have the best consequences, if it is officially supported in the US. All the Palestinians will understand it as a message of good will. On the other hand, it may pave the way to help a best understanding in the US Congress of what is at stake in the Middle East.

Should the status of Hamas be “upgraded” from a FTO (foreign terrorist organisation) to that of respectable political actor, as it had been for the PLO? Any US official endorsement of the Palestinian national reconciliation should have to answer this question.

So far, the first obstacle is the resistance among the US leaders to the idea of talking directly with Hamas. The second obstacle is Hamas’s reluctance to accept the logic of mutual concessions and compromise as a valuable political means to achieve the goal of an independent Palestinian state, which implies mutual recognition and respect.

In this context, we have two observations:

1- Hamas is identified in the US as a terrorist group, although its military wing has never operated outside the area of Israel and the Palestinian territories. Indeed, though September 11 has revealed the existence of multiple interpretations of Islam (some violently radical) and the active participation of key hardliner terrorist cells in the West, we can hardly say that Hamas fits into this picture.

International networks have played an important role in the phenomenon called “Islamic sahwa” in recent years, and consequently in the growth of religious extremism. They may be humanitarian or financial networks of the Muslim diaspora. These networks are build upon affinities and bonds of class, ethnic groups, countries, tribes, families, clans, as well as on the basis of the perception of injustice that inhibits acculturation and leads individuals sometimes onto the path of violence.

As far as we know, Hamas is not active in these networks, as it conceives its fight as local (its principal problem is with Israel not with the international arena) rather than international. On this level, it represents zero threat.

We also know that the support networks in European countries have played a key role in financing terrorist operations on an international level. As revealed the investigations after Sept.11, Muslim diasporas in countries like Germany, Great Britain, France, Spain, Belgium and Switzerland have been involved, if not in direct dealing with Al Qaeda, at least in the recruitment of would-be terrorists.

But some observers warn that Al Qaeda is not the only organisation that recruits in the Muslim diaspora. Hizbullah and Hamas (both on the blacklist of terrorist organisations) do the same thing. Are also cited in this wake some Islamic charitable and humanitarian organisations allegedly serving as a smokescreen for radical activism. Moreover, globalisation facilitated these activities: the networks have expanded. They span the globe, wherever there is a Muslim diaspora.

The US State Department has identified in this context the border region lying between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay as a focal point of Islamic extremism in Latin America. Similarly, the Chechen rebels, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the united Tadjik opposition, and Hizb Al Tahrir have used the system of some organisations for aid and support to generate funds for their own activities.

The economic and financial networks have generated considerable debate and focused the attention on the system of self-financing, and money-laundering. Some surveys have found for example that members of extremist networks in Western countries can finance their activities from an entirely legal and regular work. We also know that Al Qaeda itself has invested in various business operations in Sudan or elsewhere in the world. Al Qaeda might have greatly benefited from the illegal trade in African gold and diamonds on the black market, it seems.

Nonetheless, all this is not connected to Hamas's activities. Recruitment of non-Palestinians for its operations inside Israel and the Palestinian territories is unlikely and unproved. Yet, even if the US Congress can face these givens, another difficulty remains however. It is the second point.

2- Hamas ideology is the main problem the organisation would confront on the assumption that it is ready to exchange concessions. Hamas is representative of the classic Islamist ideology acting for a Sharia ruled state. Yet, this wouldn't be a problem if the leaders accept to give their organisation an orientation similar to the Turkish AKP. Israel and the US have diplomatic relations with Turkey, and maybe this country could eventually serve as intermediary, if ever such prospects of negotiations are serious.

So, will they talk? Maybe Palestinian reconciliation is first and foremost needed at this stage. The rest is dependent on conjuncture.